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Dirk Baltzly, Monash University (Clayton, Australia)
For presentation at the SAGP meeting 12/28/97 Philadelphia

Porphyry and Plotinus on the Reality o f Relations
Both Plotinus and Porphyry contribute in their own ways to the tradition of
neoplatonic commentaries on Aristotle’s Categories. In 6.1-2, Plotinus argues that
Aristotle’s ten categories are not adequate as an account of the genera of Being and
that for this purpose they ought to be supplanted by the five greatest kinds from
Plato’s Sophist.' In 6.3, he acknowledges that it would be desirable to have a system
of categories, not genera, for the sensible realm. He proposes several reductions of
Aristotle’s ten categories to more compact schemes and finally seems to settle on the
number five: composite, relative, quantity, quality and motion. The extent to which
Porphyry was at odds with Plotinus over the value of Aristotle’s Categories is the
subject of debate.12 Porphyry is certainly keen to claim that the work is about ‘simple
significant words insofar as they signify things’ (in Cat. 58,5) and defends it against
critics who claim that Aristotle has got the number of divisions wrong (in Cat.
59,10-34).3 In what follows I argue that Porphyry has managed to get clear about
relations and relational properties in a way that Plotinus has not. As a result, the
latter is not well placed to meet potential objections to the autonomy of Aristotle’s
category of relatives. Since this is a category that Plotinus seems to retain in his own
five-fold system, this is a problem for him.
L A ristotle’s category of relatives
Chapter 7 of Aristotle's Categories is rather like the tar baby: commenting
on τα πρός τι gets you stuck to an intractable vocabulary for discussing relations.
This is because relatives, or τά πρός τι, are not conceived by Aristotle as relations,
though the extension of relatives includes some terms we can clearly see are re
lations. The difference between relatives and relations can best be illustrated by
focusing on the problem of the ontological category of τά πρός τι: are they the
subjects between which a relation obtains, the relation, or the relational property?
The fact that there is no clear answer to this question suggests that whatever
Categories 7 is a theory of, it is probably not of relations as we understand them.
Can relatives be relations? It seems not, since there are things which count
as relatives but which are not plausibly thought of as relations. Perception, perhaps.

1 The Enneads will be cited by chapter and line numbers in the edition o f P. Henry and H.
Schwyzer (Oxford, 1964-82).
2 Strange discusses the extent to which earlier commentators may have over mphasized the
differences between Porphyry and Plotinus in the introduction to his translation. Porphyry: On
Aristotle Categories (London, 1992), 1-12.
3 A. Busse (ed.) Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca IV. 1 (Berlin, 1887).

is a relation between an object or a sense datum and a percipient. Though Aristotle
lists perception (αΐσθησις) among the relatives (6b3), he also lists the object of
perception (αισθητόν) among the relatives. One m ight think, then, that Aristotle
has lumped together in a single category both relations and relata. Were this so, we
might say that at least some of τά πρός τι are relations. However, it is also claimed
that the αισθητόν is prior to αΐσθησις (7b35). One might have the view that the
things which stand in relations must have other non-relational properties. This
question must be distinguished from the question of whether relata, qua relata, are
prior to the relations which relate them. It seems clear that they are not. Thus,
Aristotle’s category of τά πρός τι cannot be thought of as one which includes both
relations and relata per se. If he meant to discuss relata per se, then he has surely
said the wrong thing about them.
Another intially promising suggestion is that τά πρός τι are the relational
properties which qualify the relata between which a relation obtains.4 By a relational
property, I mean a one place property which has a relation and an object as
constitutents.5 Thus, if aRb, then a, in addition to being a subject of the relation R, is
also the subject for the relational property standing-in-R-to-something or perhaps
standing-in-R-to-b. That relatives might be relational properties of this sort is
suggested by the stripping argument (7a26-bl0). You can test whether you have
identified the proper correlative, i.e. what the relative is o f or in relation to, by
stripping the relative of everything except the purported correlative. So, suppose that
we say that the correlative of wing is bird. If you strip away everything except being
a bird, then the reciprocation does not remain. A wing is a wing o f a bird, but a bird
is not a bird by or o f a wing. Rather, a winged thing is a winged thing by or on
account of a wing. (Cf. knowledge is knowledge o f a knowable and a knowable is
known by knowledge.) The things which are being stripped away in this thought
experiment seem to be properties. However, properties do not come into existence or

4 This interpretation is defended at length by Mario Mignucci in ‘Aristotle’s Definition of
Relatives in Categories T , Phronesis 31 (1986), 101-27.
5 Khamara (‘Indiscernibles and the Absolute Theory of Space and Time’, Studia Leibnitiana,
Band XX/2 (1988), 140-59) attempts to tidy up the notion of a relational property in this way:
‘P is a positive relational property if and only if, for any individual, x, x’s having P consists in
x’s having a certain relation to at least one individual’ (p. 144). (In his analysis, positive
relational properties are distinguished from negative ones. The former consist in a thing’s
having a relation to something else while the latter consist in its lacking a relation to
something else.) There is room to draw a further distinction between those positive relational
properties which consist in x’s standing in a relation to something and those which consist in
x’s standing in a relation to some particular thing. The latter Khamara calls ‘impure
relational properties’.
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get destroyed, but this is exactly what is claimed for relatives at 7bl5.6 Relatives and
their correlatives, with some exceptions, come into being and are destroyed together.
Might τα πρός τι then be instances of relational properties? Aristotle is
very concerned to avoid the conclusion that no relative is a substance (8al4-36) and
apparently modifies his criterion for inclusion among the relatives just to avoid such
a conclusion. But no property instance is itself a substance and surely the author of
Categories chapters 2-5 is in as good a position to know this as anyone.78 Thus, if
relatives are instances of relational properties, Aristotle's worry is utterly mysterious.
It remains that relatives might be the things which are the subjects of
relations or relational properties. That is, they might be the relata between which a
relation obtains, considered not merely insofar as they are relata. In this sense, it is
very easy to see why Aristotle might be concerned about the question of whether
relatives are substances. If a hand is a relative thing and also a substance by virtue of
being a part of a substance, then one might be very concerned that the hand qua hand
is a substance. But even this will not do in the final analysis. At the end of Chapter
8 Aristotle is concerned that many of the things which are counted under quality will
be relatives. It turns out that it is the genus knowledge which is a relative. The
particular kinds of knowlege, like grammar, are not relatives and it is these
particular kinds which are possessed and by virtue of which a person is said to be
knowing.* Thus, when Aristotle says in Categories 7 that knowledge is among the
relatives, he cannot mean by that the person who has the knowledge.9

6I take it that in the Categories accidental properties are among those things which are both
present in and said of a subject. Thus, knowledge is present in the soul and said of the
science o f the grammatical man. Even if these secondary non-substances are dependent upon
substances, perhaps even more strongly than secondary substances are, the eternity o f the
world precludes the possibility that the properties, as opposed to the property instances,
should come into existence or be destroyed.
''Cat. 2a34-b7 makes it clear that what is present in a subject (i.e. property instances) depends
entirely upon what is neither said of nor present in a subject (i.e. primary substances). If we
add the plausible premise that where x depends on y, x is non-identical with y, we have a
good argument that no property instance is a substance.
8Ca/. 1la25, των 8è καθ’ ίκασ τα ούδέν αυτό δπερ έστίν έτέρου λέγεται. I take the καθ’
έκεστα to be the species of knowledge, not the instances o f those species. If the thing whose
presence makes people έχιστήμονες (1 la34) is not itself a relative, I presume that there is no
reason to think that the subject in which this is present is a relative.
9 Mignucci provides some additional arguments against the identification o f relatives with
things; e.g. ‘the larger’ with Jones who is larger than Smith. First, everything w ill be a
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This is a very cursory examination of the reference of πρός τι in Categories.
It might emerge that there is a best candidate forw hat τά πρός τι are. That is, there
might be one interpretation which seems to cover more of the cases than any
competitor and has the fewest passages which tell against it.10 Alternatively, we may
find that it is best not to try to map Aristotle’s distinctions onto our own conceptual
framework of relations, relata and relational properties and try to work with them on
their own.11 Be that as it may, what I want to suggest now is that to adopt Aristotle’s
terminology is to invite oonfiision, for it is surely not clear on the face of it just what
Aristotle is talking about. In what follows, I shall argue that Plotinus falls victim to
the tar baby of πρός τι, though, by virtue of having the term σχέσις available to him,
he does make some progress in untangling matters. It falls to Porphyry, I think, to
see clearly the difference between relations, relata and relational properties. I must,
however, acknowledge the possibility that this impression may be created by the fact
that we have fewer texts from Porphyry which are relevant to the issue. Perhaps in
the lost To Geladius, he too got stuck by the tar baby, but the surviving shorter
commentary on the Categories seems to be free from this confusion.
Π. Worries about the reality of relations
In Ennead 6.1.6-7 Plotinus presents and attempts to answer some worries
about the ontological status of relations. Particularly worrisome are what later came
to be called ‘internal relations’. I shall say that two terms, a and b are internally
related by relation R just in case a and b have properties which logically necessitate

relative since everything is self-identical. Second, this would obviously contravene A ristotle’s
rule that no relative is a substance.
10I f we must choose between the plausible modem candidates, Mignucci’s identification o f τα
πρός τ ι w ith relational properties has the fewest problems. It is not unreasonable for A ristotle
to slide back and forth between describing relational properties and instances of those
properties.
111 prefer to regard A ristotle’s relatives as what I call ‘accidental beings’. Thus, the relative
‘the larger’ is a being which bears the relation o f accidental identity to Jones. Accidental
beings are nearly the same thing as what Frank Lewis calls ‘accidental compounds’
(Substance and Predication in Aristotle (Oxford, 1992). Unlike Lewis, however, I prefer to
withhold judgement about whether all accidental beings must be compounds of some
particular substance and its accidents. It strikes me that the κυρίω ς πόσα o f Cat. 6 may be
accidental beings which depend upon the existence o f primary substances in general, but not
any particular primary substance.
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that the relation between them obtain.12 Some relations are such that pairs (or ntuples) which instantiate them are always internally related by R. Thus, similarityin-respect-of-being-F is an internal relation since any two things, a and b, are
similar-in-respect-of-being-F only if both are F. This fact about internal relations
makes it very tempting to be reductionist about the facts regarding whether they
obtain: that is, the fact that aRpb (where RF is the internal relation necessitated by its
relata being F) is nothing over and above the fact that Fa and Fb. Whether this
reduction suceeds depends in large measure on how we count facts. If we individuate
facts or events by their causes and effects, then it appears the reduction might be suc
cessful. The similarity, for instance, of a and b has no causal consequences over and
above the event of a's being and ô’s being F.13 If, however, one accepts an epistemic
criterion, then these appear to be distinct. One can certainly know that Fa and Fb but
still fail to know that aRFb. If we accept the causal criterion (and for the sake of
argument in what follows I will), then we may well be suspicious that there is some
fact that consists in aRFb over and above the facts Fa and Fb. This thought leads to

12 See Armstrong (A Theory ofU niversals: Universals and Scientific Realism vol 2
(Cambridge, 1978), p. 85) for this formulation of the intem al/extem al distinction. It seems to
run counter to the idealists’ use o f‘internal relations’. When they said that all relations are
internal, one thing they seem to have meant was that the relations that a thing stands in are all
essential to it. Had it failed to stand in those relations, it wouldn’t have been the very same
thing that it presently is. Armstrong’s notion of intem ality is such that a thing might have an
internal relation which was necessitated by monadic properties o f the relata which were purely
accidental.
13One’s intuitions about the causal criterion depend on what we allow to count as a property.
To take A ristotle’s example fromMetaph. 6.3, both the robbers and the man may have the
property ofbeing at the well at 2 o’clock. This necessitates a certain internal relation:
resembling each other in respect ofbeing at the well at 2 o’clock, or perhaps the relation of
being in the same place at the same time. But there seem to be causal consequences of their
both being at the well at 2 which are not consequences o f each party being at the well
individually at 2 — to wit, the man dies by violence and the robbers have more money. I
think that it is important to the case that these are impure relations which involve essential
reference to particulars. It is hard to see how the possession o f a pure properties and the pure
internal relation which they entail could fail to be causally indiscernable from one another. To
take an example from David Armstrong, if a machine sorts things by colour and both a and b
are red, their resemblance makes no difference to what w ill happen to them in the sorting,
only their individual colour.
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suspicions about the ontological credentials of the relation Rp.1415 The facts about
what terms stand in Rp supervenes on the distribution of F-ness in much the same
way that, say, the average height of a group of people supervenes on facts about how
tall the members of the group are. One might rather incautiously put this point by
saying, ‘There isn’t really the property of having an average height of 200cm
possessed by groups; rather there are really just properties like having a height of
195cm and so on had by individuals who are members of a group.’ We might say
this to someone who mistakenly thought that the average height of the people in the
seminar might vary independently of the heights of individuals. Similarly, an
incautious way of asking whether there are relations at all is to ask, ‘Are all relations
internal?’
There is a cheap and easy way to get an affirmative answer to this question.
One can use impure relational properties to show that all relations are internal. A
impure relational property is easily constructed by putting the second subject of the
relation from which it derives into the predicate place.I} Thus, if a bears R to b, then
a has the property bearing-R-to-6. But such properties seem to be somehow
gratuitious. Relational properties, unlike relations, seem to be further analysable into
parts. What are those parts? They include a relation and another particular.
Moreover, one can object to impure properties and relations generally. Regarding
them as genuine properties which must be reckoned with by the Principle of the
Identity of Indiscernibles makes that principle trivially true. We ought to think that
impure properties and relations are metaphysically insubstantial to the extent that we
thought that arguing about the identity of indiscernibles was a substantive
metaphysical issue.
There is much that could be said about the reality of internal relations and I
am not entirely comfortable with dismissing them as Armstrong does. Be that as it
may, we are now in a position to see how the dialectic between the friends of
relations and reductionists can unfold. One can try to use impure relational
properties to argue that all relations are internal and thus, on one criterion at least,
reducible to monadic properties. The alleged reduction m ight well be a cheat since
the relational properties which are used to reduce the relation themselves presuppose
relations. But, depending on how the issue is formulated, it is not an easy cheat to

14Armstrong’s sparse ontology o f properties and relations has no room for such slackers as R f.
He endorses what he calls The Reductive Principle fo r internal relations: ‘If two or more
particulars are internally related, then the relation is nothing more than the possession by the
particulars of the properties which necessitate them. ’ (p. 86)
15Lloyd Humberstone (‘Intrinsic/Extrinsic’, forthcoming in Synthèse, July 1996) considers a
number of ways in which one can generate relational properties from relations. This tactic,
which he calls ‘place fixing’ produces Khamara’s category o f impure relational properties.
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detect. For this reason a grasp o f the distinction between relational properties
(particularly impure ones) and relations is essential i f one is adequately to address
the question o f whether there are relations or not. In Ennead 6, Plotinus is
grappling with this very issue, but seems to lack the distinction between relational
properties and relations.
HL Plotinus and the reality of relations
In 6.1.6 Plotinus acknowledges that only some relations pose questions
about whether they exist dr not. Some of the relatives have an έργον or á single
activity which leaves us in no doubt about their existence.16 Thus, knowledge is
active in relation to its object and brings about an activity — knowing. Similarly, the
measure does a single work in relation to the íitéásüred thing: it measures it. "But
what product (άπογέννώμένον) would the like have iii relation to the like?' asks
Plotinus. He worries that in such cases there is nothing over and above the
qualification of each thing by the quality. This, then, is just the point about the
reality of internal relations. However, it is immediately turned into an issue about
the mind-dependence of relations.
But what is the relation (σχέσις) other than our judgement when
we compare (παραβαλλόντων) things which are what they are by
themselves (τα έφ’ έαυτων όντα & έστι) and say ‘this thing and
this thing have the same size and the same quality', and ‘this man
has produced this man, and this man controls this man9? (6.1.6,
21-5)

;
I
I
I
I

^
I
I
I;
I
I
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H

16Another interesting question is whether Plotinus has any Specific philosophical school in
mind in this passage. It seems pretty clear that sonie philosophers argued against the reality
of relatives. The Epicurean Polystratus insists* presumably against some unnamed opponents,
on the reality of τά πρός τ ι (On Irrational Contempt xxv-xxvii). Sextus claims that the
outline account of some of the dogmatists commit them to the unreality o f relatives because
they say that πρός τί σ έτι τό πρός έτέρφ νοούμενον rather than ϋπάρχον Μ viii, 453-4.
He then rehearses a series of skeptical arguments for the unreality o f relatives from 455-62,
Von Amim included bothM viii, 453 (= Π.404) andM ix, 352 (= Π.80) in SVF. Jonathon
Barnes has recently árguéd that the position on thé mind-dependence o f relatives articulated
here is not, in fact, Stoic ('B its and Pieces' in Mario Mignucci and Jonathon Barnes (eds),
Matter and Metaphsyics:Fourth Symposium Hellenisticum (Naples, 1988), 251-9). I think
that Barnes may be a bit hasty. Elsewhere I argue that the Stoics have a motive for saying that
things do not have parts καθ’ αυτό and that a plausible case can be made that they regard
parts in the same way in which they regard limits: somethings which are neither corporeal nor
incorporeal (cf. SVFR.4%7 and 488; Diogenes Laertius viii. 135). Both parts and limits are, of
course, relatives.
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Similarly,
What then would there be over and above these things which are
related to each other except our thinking their juxtaposition?
Exceeding is a matter of one thing of one definite size and another
of another definite size; and this one and that one are two different
things; the comparison (παραβολλή) eûmes from us and is not in
them. (6.1.6,29-33)
We can isolate two sorts of confusion in these passages. One concerns mind-depend
ence and the other concerns relational properties. I will discuss them in turn.
If it were possible to Show that all relations are internal, there would be at
least two ways of describing this outcome. One could be an eliminativist about them
and say that, because ‘relation’ implies the existence of something over and above
the having of monadic properties, the fact that all relations are internal shows that
there are no relations. Alternatively, one might say that, if all relations are internal,
then every relation ju st is the pair of monadic predicates which necessitates it. This,
I take it, is one kind of reduction. In neither case is there any issue about minddependence. The only way in which our cognitive attitudes toward relations are
involved is that, in the first case, we might say that we thought that there were
relations (but we were wrong) and in the second that by thinking of the relation we
really think of the relevant pair of monadic properties.
It sounds as if in 6.1.6 Plotinus is considering the reductionist view. What
would be the case if the relation Were nothing but our judgement?
What would sitting and standing be besides the thing which is
sitting or standing? And State, when it is said of the thing which
has it, would rather signify having [the last Aristotelian category?],
and when it is said of the thing had, it would signify qualify. (259)
The thought here seems to be that πρός τι would be reduced to different categories.
Contrary to what we initially thought, relatives are qualities, etc. But, when Plotinus
is reflecting on the contents of 6.1.6 at the end of 6.1.7 it sounds as if he is
considering the eliminitavist interpretaton.17 He notes that some relations can cease
to obtain simply if the relata change their position.

17 That Plotinus moves back and forth between the eliniinativist and reductionist
interpretations would not be surprising if he was reacting to something like the position
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*
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From such cases in particular came our suspicion that in things of
this kind the relation is nothing. (21-2)
To say that the relation is nothing is not to say that it is something different from
what we first thought that it was. It is rather to say that there is no such thing as the
1 relation.
Plotinus formulates an explicitly eliminativist view about relations in the
context of a discussion of the Stoic conception of soul. According to Plotinus, the
Stoics think that life and soul are nothing but the material breath, but they also grant
that there are some portions of the breath which are lifeless. To explain this, they
say that life and soul are the breath so disposed (πώς έχον). He then asks:
But what is this so disposed which they are always talking about,
and in which they are forced to take refuge when they are made to
admit another working principle besides body? . . . either they will
say that this ‘so disposed’ and relation (σχέσις) is one of the
beings or it is not. If not, then soul is only breath and 'so disposed'
just a word. And thus it will happen for them that they will not be
saying that soul and God are anything but matter, and all these will
be names, and there will only be matter. But if the relation is
among the things that are and18 it is something else besides the
substrate and the matter, in matter but immaterial itself—because it
is not again composed of matter and form—then it would be a
λόγος and not a body and so of a different nature. 4.7.4, 9-21
On Plotinus’ view, eliminativism is the only option open to the Stoics and if they
take it, their defence of soul collapses (in addition to the unintuitive result that
σχέσις is just a word). They cannot reduce it to one of their material principles
because a σχέσις is not simply the substrate and matter but must be λόγος and
immaterial.
This passage sheds light on the discussion in 6.1.6 in two ways. First, it
confirms what 6.1.7, 21-2 suggested: Plotinus is able to formulate an eliminativist
advanced by Sextus in M. 453-61. It is not clear whether Sextus takes the arguments that he
υ gives here to support that thesis that τά πρός τ ι άνύπαρκτά έστι (462) or that they έν
έπινοίςι μόνον έστι (453). Perhaps Sextus assumes that if relatives are merely in the mind,
then they do not exist in the sense in which everyone thinks that they exist.
k 18We must, I think, take this κ α ί as epexegetical. If die meaning o f the first conjunct leaves
room for die denial o f the second conjunct, then Plotinus’ argument has no force against the
Stoics.
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view. For the relation to be ‘not among the things that are’ is for it to be a word
which does not latch onto anything. People who use the word do not manage to say
either anything true or, alternatively, what they want to say. In either case, here at
least, he is able to distinguish issues about elimination horn mind-dependence.
Further, we can now see at least one reason why he would want to defend the reality
of relations. The Stoics might respond to Plotinus’ argument by saying that πώς
έχον is real but still material by claiming that the disposition is nothing over and
above the qualities which necessitate it. These, of course, are material according to
them.
It is also important to note that in 6.1.6, 24-5 Plotinus puts expresses
position of his hypothetical objector by helping himself to impure relational
properties to turn seemingly external relations into internal ones. The relation
between size and equality is very different from that between mastership and control
over a man. From the fact that a has length I and b has l-n, it follows that a exceeds
b in length and this is true for any other c which has length l-n. The size itself is
not object directed. However, from the fact that a has control over a man and b is
controlled by a man, it does not follow that a is the master of b. Control over a man
is not control over b. Plotinus bridges the gap by using the demonstrative pronouns
‘this’ and ‘that’, but what is at issue in this purported reduction are really the
possession of the impure relational properties having-control-over-b and beingcontrolled-by-a. A sharp distinction between relations and relational properties,
especially impure ones, would help him see the difficulty here.
What of Plotinus’ defence against the reductionist/eliminativist? The first
part of 6.1.7 consists in a long and convoluted conditional, the consequent of which
is that we ought not to be worried about arguments for the claim that relations do not
exist. Each part of the conditional, however, is best interpreted as yet another reason
for thinking that relations are real. If it were the case that there was nothing to a
relation except our judgement, then it would be the case that our judgements were
false and σχέσις would be an empty term. But the reductionist need not claim that
the reducibUity of relations to monadic properties implies that the judgement ‘a is
sim ilar to b' is false. It is rather the case that it simply means ‘a is F and b is F’.
Nor would ‘relation’ be a meaningless term. It simply indicates that properly co
ordinated monadic predicates hold for each of the relata.
Plotinus’ remaining arguments are not much better. If it is true that a is
before b and that ‘before’ is something other than the relata, then relations are real.
The reductionist can grant that ‘before’ signifies something other than the relata: it
signifies that the relata are such that appropriately co-ordinated monadic predicates
obtain in each case. This he can do if we allow him relational predicates such as
‘being-prior-in-time-to-b’ or ‘happening at noon on Friday’. Plotinus also claims
that relations are real if aRb is true even when we don't say or think it. The critic
can allow this too: aRpb is true even when we don't judge this simply because aRpb
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is nothing more than Fa and Fb. The same can be said for Plotinus’ claim that re
lations are real if our knowledge of them is directed upon a knowable.
Having given what he regards as good arguments against the reductionist,
Plotinus asks what is common to all relations. It is not enough, he says, for
something to be πρός τι if it is simply ‘of another’ as a soul is a soul of a body. We
have a genuine case of πρός τι only when
the existence derives from nowhere other than from the relation (έκ
της σχέσεως) and the existence is not that of the subjects, but of
what is said πρός τι. For instance, the double πρός the half gives
existence to neither the two-cubit long nor in general to two, nor to
the one-cubit long, nor generally to one, but when these are in a
relation (κατά τήν σχέσις), besides being two and one
respectively, the one is called and is double and the other will be
half in the same way. Both of them generate together out of
themselves something else, the double and the half, which came
into being in relation to one another, and the being is not
something other than the reciprocity; it belongs to the double fiom
exceeding the half and to the half from being exceeded. (6.1.7, 2635).
The double and the half are clearly the things said πρός τι here, but what are these?
It can't be the relational properties ‘being half of the length of a’ and ‘being double
the length of b ’ because these are not generated. It might be the instances of the
relational properties or it might be the relata, not qua one-cubit and so on, but qua
double and half. The fact that he distinguishes the existence of the πρός τι from that
of the ΰποκειμένον does not mean that he is removing from consideration the
υποκείμενον qualified in a certain way, though perhaps it makes it more likely that
he has in mind the property instance. Worse, it seems that the distinction between
the relation and the monadic predicates which necessitate the relation is in danger.
On the one hand, we are told that the existence of the πρός τι λέγεται derives from
the σχέσις, but he also says that the being of double and half belongs to the double
from exceeding the half and the half by being exceeded. But the exceeding is simply
a matter of the possession of the monadic properties ‘having length V and ‘having
length f-n ’ respectively. But it is ju st this determination o f the relation by the
monadic properties o f the relata which is the issue with the reductionist. Plotinus is
hampered in his response here because the example that he has chosen as his
illustration is already an internal relation—the kind that is most susceptible to
reduction.
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Unfortunately, Plotinus’ example of double and half is common to his other
attempts to explicate relatives. In summing up at the end of 6.3.28 he writes:
And about the relative (πρός τι), that it is the relation (σχέσις) of
one thing in relation to (πρός) another, and that there is a relative
whenever the relation of a substance makes it; the substance is not
a relative qua substance, but either insofar as (καθό) it is part—for
example hand or head—or cause or principle or elem ent
This passage makes the identification of relatives with the subject qua double
tempting. If καθό μέρος is doing the same sort of classificatoiy work here as $
ούσία, then Plotinus’ point is that the relative is not the thing considered as a
substance, but rather the thing considered as a double.
This is not to say that Plotinus makes no progress at all in the matter of rela
tives. There is the threat that the criterion of simply being ’of another’ will allow the
relatives to engulf all the other categories except substance since each accident is an
accident o f a substance.19 Plotinus provides an interesting response to this threat. In
6.3.21 he argues that movement ought not be referred to πρός τι simply because it is
of something, since by the same token quantity and quality will be under relation.
But if it is because these are something, even if they are of
something insofar as they are, that the one is called quality and the
other quantity, and in the same way, since motion is motion of
something, it is something before it is o f something, and this we
should grasp on its own (έφ’ αύτοΰ). On the whole, one should set
down as πρός τι not what first is, and then is of something else, but
what the relation (σχέσις) generates without anything other thing
besides the relation by which it is called. For example, the double,
insofar as it is called double, takes its generation and existence in
the comparision with the one-ciibit and, without anything before
this coming to mind, it is called and is double in being compared to
something else.
It is a promising beginning. Neither motion nor quantity or quality in general is a
relative because each has a nature of its own prior to being an accident of a thing.
Again we are told that the πρός τι is generated from the σχέσις. But we have no

l9Cf. Simplicius in Cat. 63,23-8 for a report o f “some” who did this. It would be nice to know
if this was also the ground for Xenocrates’ insistence on the adequacy o f Plato’s categories of
καθ’ αυτό and πρός τι (Simplic. in Cat 63,21-3 = Xenocrates fr. 12) in contrast with
Aristotle's categories.
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clue here whether the πρός τι is the property instance or the thing so qualified.
Moreover, παραβεβλήσθαι is somewhat worrying, especially in such close proximity
to νοούμεvov. While ‘comparison’ and ‘in being compared’ can be used in an
impersonal sense, they can also carry the connotation of an act of comparing.
Presumably what Plotinus does not want to say is that the σχέσις which generates
the double and the half is our act of comparing the size of the two things. This, I
take it, would make the relation mind-dependent. This seems to be confirmed by
what he says in 6.1.7:
. . .one must respond that thé relation itself produces the relatives,
and they are not produced merely by being said to be in relation to
another. When there is softie existence, whether it is of a different
or in relation to a different, it possesses a nature prior to being a
relative. Actuality and movement and state, though being o f
another, do not lose priority to being relative and being thought in
themselves; otherwise in this way everything will be a relative, for
all things have some relation to something, as in the case of soul.
His point must surely be that we can be aware of the comparison (in the impersonal
sense) which generated the relatives prior to awareness of it, without being aware of
any καθ’ αύτό φύσις before the comparison. But it is notable, I think, that the same
vocabulary shows up in the passages from 6.1.6-7 quoted above. Perhaps it is for this
reason that Plotinus equates the réduction of relations to the properties which
necessitate them with the mind-dependence of relations.
To sum up, Plotinus is not able adequately to address the question of the
existence of relations because he confitses the reduction of all relations to internal
relations with the issue of the mind-dependence of relations. Further, he confuses
reduction with elimination. Finally, he is not able to assess the prospects for such a
reduction because he does not distinguish between pure and impure relational
properties. Indeed, at times it is not even clear that he adequately distinguishes
between relations and relational properties—pure or impure. Many o f these
difficulties are not of Plotinus’ own making. He has handled the ambiguous
vocabulary of πρός τι from Categories 7 and becorhe stuck to it.

IV. Porphyry the hero
Porphyry never addresses the reductionist gambit on its own. He does, how
ever, come close to this line of argument in the course of clarifying Aristotle’s second
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account of relatives in chapter 7 of Categories.™ There he encounters the objection
that this account is circular. He gives the following defence: We say sometimes that
white qua white is the colour that pierces the eyes, so that no one will think that the
body which also happens to be called white pierces the eyes. We have not thereby
included the term 'white' in the definition of White in any harmful way. Aristotle did
not say that relatives are the same as being reláted to something, rather they are the
things for which their being [qua relatives] is the same as their being somehow
related to something.
So relatives consist in the relation (σχέσις) of subjects to one
another, and do not exist in virtue of the subjects of this relation,
the being of which is not the same as their being related to one
another. But the relation that obtains between relatives is just their
standing in some way in relation to one another, so that relatives
are indeed those things for which th d r being is the same as their
being in someway related to one another. (124,21-25, tr. Strange)
In this passage Porphyry not only clarifies Aristotle's claim, but he also defends a
realist view of relations. They are emphatically not the same as the being of the
subjects. Nor are they reducible to the properties of thé relata:
For ‘double’—let us suppose it is the ratio o f four to two—does not
belong to the relatives in virtue of the four or in virtue of the two,
but insofar as the four stands to the two in the ratio (έν λόγψ)
double and the two to the four in the ratio (έν λόγψ) of half.
(124,19-21, tr. Strange)
The béing of the relation is not reducible to the fact that one'relata is four [measures]
aiid the other two. The relation obtains in virttie of//re ratio between them. In what
follows he articulates the distiitction between1 relations and relational properties
which is crucial to the defence of sucha realist approach.
The relation is like an intermediate term (μέΰον) between the
subjects of the relation, in virtue of which the relative terms come

MAt 8a31 Aristotle faces the problem that if the criterion for being a relative is simply to be of
another, then parts o f both primary and secondary substances w ill be relatives. He considers
the, apparently narrower, criterion τά πρός τι ο ίς τό είνα ι ταΰτόν έστι τφ πρός πως Ιχειν.
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to exist: they acquire a property21 over and above those of their
subjects precisely in that consideration of them reveals a certain
connection between them, in virtue of which they are called by the
names of the relative terms. (125,17-19)
Porphyry here makes it clear that he takes Aristotle’s τά κρός τι to be relational
properties. Moreover, he explicitly acknowledges the dependence of such properties
upon their constituent relation. It is this, and not the properties, which is like a
middle term.
The differences here between Porphyry and Plotinus are subtle. It is, of
course, possible that what we have left of Porphyry’s writing simply does not allow
him the opportunity to put his foot in his mouth. But, allowing for this, we may say
that:
1.

Porhyry does not use the language of comparison (παραβολλή) in
the statement of his examples, preferring the decidedly impersonal
ratio (λόγος). Perhaps for this reason he in no way suggests that
relations are mind-dependent

2.

Porphyry, but not Plotinus, consistently maintains that relations are
independent of the monadic properties of the relata. This is so
even with a relation like double which seems to be internal. Thus,
he is strongly realist about relations.

3.

Porphyry, but not Plotinus, consistently uses Aristotle’s misleading
vocabulary of πρός τι to refer to the relational properties which the
subjects of a relation acquire by virtue of standing in the relation.

V. And what difference it makes
Let us suppose that Porphyry is careful to distinguish relations from
relational properties. He will then be well equiped to defend the reality of relations
from arguments which seek to reduce relations to monadic properties had by the
relata. What difference does the reality of relations make to Porphyry’s own
philosophical views?

21Strange, I think, understands πλεονάζουσα παρά τά υποκείμενα to imply that they appear
to acquire a further property. He translates τά υποκείμενα κατά σχέσιν τήν πρός άλληλα
πλεονεκτοΰντα φ αίνεται at 124,29-30 in the same way. In 125,17-19 the word ποιάν
actually appears, but he takes it with τινα συνάφειαν. Its position in the sentence certainly
suggests this.
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It has been alleged that Poiphyiy “telescopes” the three distinct hypostases
of Plotinus’ metaphysics, producing a more “monistic” system.22 The idea is that the
tension in Plotinus between nous and soul as independent hypostases and as things
which have their being in relation to the One is resolved in favor of dependence:
because nous and soul exist in relation to the One, they are mere appearances and
thus, in some sense, illusory. In particular, it has been claimed that the embodiment
of the soul is an illusion of thought. One reason for this concerns Porphyiy’s claim
that the soul is not in the body but is rather related to it. In Sententia 28 he claims
that soul is not present in a body like a beast in a cage or water in a skin. It could not
be, for soul, like all incorporeals, is both everywhere and nowhere (Sent. 1, 2, 27, 31,
35). Instead, soul’s powers are made manifest in a certain place through a certain
διαθέσις of the soul.23 This is true of all incorporeals. When they “act” upon
bodies, it is not they who actually do the acting. Porphyry adapts Plotinus’ notion of
an inner and outer activity to explain how incorporeals act on corporeals. In V.4.2,
Plotinus distinguished between the inner ένέργεια of fire — the essential heat that it
has that makes it what it is — and the heat that it gives off. In this context, Plotinus
is discussing how Νούς results from the One without the One undergoing any kind
of change. Just as with fire, there is an inner activity of the One which is its
substance and something different which is generated from it — a συνούσης
ένεργείας. Similarly, Porphyry identifies a δύναμις that is proximate to bodies
when an incorporeal like soul inclines toward them. This δύναμις is not itself a
second soul: Porphyry wants no part of this idea which may be found in Numenius.24
Nonetheless, Porphyry uses language which suggests that it is in some sense
substantial (δύναμιν ύπέστεησε Sent. 4). Smith has argued that this δύναμις is to
be equated with the Plotinian lower soul and is regarded by Porphyry as like
immanent form.23 This is tempting and would perhaps explain Porphyry’s apparent
inconsistency on the question of whether embodiment detracts from the soul’s unity.
In Sententia 37 he claims that it does not, while in 28 he says that it does. Perhaps
the “unparticipated soul” is not diminished but the soul which is like immanent form
is. However, this account of the ontological status of the δύναμις doesn’t quite do
justice to some of the details of Porphyty’s account. He insists that a soul’s activity is

22 A.C. Lloyd in The Cambridge H istory o f Later Greek and Early M edieval Philosophy,
chapter 18, ed A.H. Armstrong (Cambridge, 1967).
23Sent 27,12-14, διαθέσει τοίνυν ποι$ έκεΐ εύρίσκεται, όπου κ α ί διά κειται, τόπφ δν
πανταχοΰ καί ούδαμοΰ. διό ποι$ διαθέσει ή ύπέρ ουρανόν ή έν μέρει που τού κόσμου
κεκράτηται.
24 Stobaeus L 350,25.
23 Andrew Smith, Porphyry’s Place in the Neoplatonic Tradition (The Hague, 1974), 12.
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localised because of a kind of inclination and disposition toward a certain body. This
is not so in the relation between Forms and immanent forms in other cases. The
presence of whiteness in the paper on my desk is a result of the contemplation of
World Soul or Nature on passive matter for Plotinus (and presumably also for
Porphyry); cf. Plot. ΙΠ.8.2. It is not the case that White Itself is localised here
because the very Form inclines or has a disposition toward it. Thus, though the
δύναμις which the body receives when the soul inclines toward it may be
ontologically on a par with immanent form — that is, it may be every bit as real as
immanent form, pacé Lloyd — it is not simply immanent form. I shall argue that the
δύναμις discussed in Sententia 4 and 28 is in fact best thought of as a relational
property which a body acquires when it stands in a certain relation to incorporeal
soul.
The Sententia contain hints of the relational doctrine of embodiment, but
the fragments of Σύμμικτα ζητήματα are a bit more explicit.
When it is said that soul is in a body this (kies not mean that it is in
the place where the body is. Rather, the soul is in a relation or
present to the body, as we say God is in us. For we say that the
soul is attached to the body tty a relation or relational inclination
and disposition, as we say that the lover is attached to the beloved,
not physically or spatially, but by a relation. ... If then an
intelligible can stand in a relation to a place or a thing which has a
place, then we may by a misuse of language say that it is here on
account of the fact that its activity (ένέργειαν) is here and we take
the activity or relation for the place. But we ought to say ‘it acts
here’ when we say ‘it is here’. (26IF, 42-63, Smith)
I take it that the ένέργεια which is in a place is the actuality of the δύναμις that is
discussed in Sententia 4 and 28. It is something that a location or thing acquires
when it stands in a relation to an intelligible like soul. It will be a relational property
which a body acquires not because of what it is in itself, but because it stands in a
certain relation to something else. This is just the distinction that Porphyry draws at
in Cat 124,26-30 and 125,16-19.
What is this relation? It may well be that there are a variety of relations.
Porphyry is not clear about whether the inclination which a soul has toward a
particular body is a matter of that soul’s own volitioa Note that in Sententia 7-9 we
seem to have two deaths or separations of soul and body: one which nature secures
and one which philosophy aims at. These are independent of one another. Perhaps
one relation of inclination is a matter of the soul deciding whether to live for what is
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above or what is below, while the other is necessitated by the falling away from
perfection exhibited in all emmanation from the One. The former is certainly
suggested by the analogy of lover and beloved in this passage.
In Porphyry’s examples from in Cat., both the things that stand in a relation
acquire a relational property over and above the properties they have considered only
in themselves. This presents a complication, for Porphyry seems to want to deny that
the soul undergoes any kind of affection when it inclines toward a body.26 But if
inclination is a relation which obtains between the soul and a body in virtue of which
the bodÿ acquires the relational property I have identified with the δύναμις Porphyry
describes in Sent. 4 and 28, how is it that the soul acquires no relational property?
Will it not be changed by inclining toward a body? One way that Porphyry could
address this problem is to appeal to the idea that gaining and losing properties in the
category of πρός τι is not a change in a thing’s substance or its accidents. They are,
as he says, external to their subjects.27 But this does not make relatives unreal.
Aristotle’s view is that τά πρός τι are the least of all things substance (.Metaph.
1088a24-bl), but being the least of all things is not yet to be nothing at all and there
is no reason to think that Porphyry would find anything in this with which to
disagree. In fact, because Porphyry is careful to distinguish between relational
properties and relations it is even less likely that he thinks of the soul’s embodiment
as in some way illusory or unreal. For, even if the relational property that the soul
acquires is ‘least of all things a substance’. Porphyry is capable of distinguishing this
relational property from the relation which endows the soul with it. This relation or
relations — perhaps a kind of concern together with a natural inclination — are
quite real.
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26 Sent. 21,18-21, ώς ούν τό τρέπεσθαι κ α ί πάσχειν έν τφ συνθέτω τφ έξ ύλης τε καί
είδους, δπερ ήν τό σώ μα-ού μήν τή ύλη τούτο προσήν-, ούτω και τό ζήν και
άποθνησκειν κ α ί πάσχειν κατά τούτο έν τφ συνθέτφ έκ ψυχής καί σώματος θεωρείται
But see Sent 18,6-8, τά μέν γάρ ύλης κεχω ρισμένα κ α ί σωμάτων ένεργείαις ήν τά
αυτά, τά δέ ύλη πλησιάζοντα και σώμασιν α υτά μέν άπαθή, ^ά δέ έφ’ ών θεωρείται
πάσχει. The things that incline to matter and body may be the ένέργεια or δύναμις which
the soul’s relation to body engenders in the body.
27 in Cat 125,25-28, *Ότι έν τοίς ύποκειμένοις έστίν ούτε ώς ούσίας συμπληρωτικόν
ούτε ώς άλλο τ ι τών συμβεβηκότων, & έν αύτοΐς τοίς ύποκειμένοις γίνετα ι, οΐον πάθος
ή ένέργεια, άλλά τι έξωθεν, διό καί μή πασχόντων τών υποκειμένων γίνετα ι κ α ί
άπογίνεται.

